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Abstract
Many interesting problems in the Internet industry can be framed as a two-sided
marketplace problem. Examples include search applications and recommender
systems showing people, jobs, movies, products, restaurants, etc. Incorporating
fairness while building such systems is crucial and can have deep social and eco-
nomic impact (applications include job recommendations, recruiters searching for
candidates, etc.). In this paper, we propose a definition and develop an end-to-end
framework for achieving fairness while building such machine learning systems
at scale. We extend prior work [29] to develop an optimization framework that
can tackle fairness constraints from both the source and destination sides of the
marketplace, as well as dynamic aspects of the problem. The framework is flex-
ible enough to adapt to different definitions of fairness and can be implemented
in very large-scale settings. We perform simulations to show the efficacy of our
approach.
1 Introduction
Most early work on fairness in machine learning has focused on classification tasks and has strived
to achieve fairness as defined through notions such as demographic parity, equality of opportunity,
and equalized odds on protected attributes [1, 18]. Increasingly, businesses are relying on AI to
recommend goods and services, thereby creating a need to define and address the bias that may
exist in large-scale ranking or recommender systems. The traditional definitions of fairness do not
necessarily extend to ranking or recommender systems, and sensible definitions of fairness in such
systems are inherently more challenging than the classification use case [29]. These challenges are
magnified when people are both viewing recommendations from as well as being recommended by
the ranking system [12, 26], presenting a need for fairness to members engagingwith a recommender
through multiple roles.
Depending on the application, recommender systems may be facilitating either a single-sided or
multi-sided marketplace. A single-sided marketplace, in which users participate through a single
role, usually consists of people who are either consumers or viewers, (for example members viewing
items [23], products [28], jobs [22], movies, restaurants [27], etc.). A two-sided member-to-member
marketplace, which arises when members can serve multiple functions, consists of the interplay be-
tween two parties such as consumers and producers, or viewers and viewees. While the terminology
used to describe the two parties is often application dependent, for simplicity, we will refer to the
consumer or viewer side as the source side and the producer or viewee side as the destination side.
Common examples of two-sided marketplaces include feed ranking [2, 3], people or friend recom-
mendations [13] and search systems [4] involving people on both sides such as recruiters searching
for job candidates [10]. Moreover, recommender systems can be categorized according to whether
they require explicit queries (for example people searching of items, restaurants, etc., recruiters
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searching for candidates, and so on) or implicit queries (users visiting to a platform to look at feed
posts, check friend or connection recommendations, etc.).
We are interested in guaranteeing fairness to groups of participants engaging in two-sided market-
place products. To ensure such a product is treating members fairly, especially with regards to
protected attributes, we want to guarantee that the rankings are fair to the source members initiating
the queries (either explicit or implicit), as well as the destination members who are being returned
by the query.
In this paper, we first describe formal notions of fairness using member utility in a two-sided market-
place. The notions of utility we use in this paper are related to fairness in rankings [5, 8, 14, 29, 32].
Based on these definitions, we cast the problem of a fair two-sided marketplace as an optimization
problem subject to appropriate fairness constraints. We extend the work of Singh and Joachims [29]
that considers (in our terminology) the destination -side fairness on a per-session, per-query level,
in the following ways:
• We define a multi-session utility and add fairness constraints for destination members
across multiple sessions
• Through a similar setup, we add fairness constraints for source members.
The extension to multi-session fairness requires a significant reformulation of the fairness criteria;
however, we still manage to keep the optimization formulation linear even after adding the different
kinds of fairness constraints described above. Under this new framework, we provide a re-ranker,
which is fair to both source and destination members, while transitioning from a single-session to a
multiple-session framework. We also provide a solution that can be deployed online (as opposed to
a static solution) and scale for large-scale recommender systems by using a duality idea.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we define the notions of fairness and
formally state the problem. Section 3 describes the fairness constraints, and the optimization frame-
work for destinationmembers. We extent the procedure to sourcemembers in Section 4. Simulation
experiments are shown in Section 5 to show the efficacy of our approach, before concluding with a
discussion in Section 6. We end this section with an overview of the related works in literature.
Related Work: In general, there are three approaches to debiasing in a recommendation system.
The first approach is preprocessing which aims to remove bias that may exist in the training data
[19, 24] prior to learning a model. Since features may be correlated with protected attributes, it
may be difficult to tease out the biasing signal completely. The second approach is to incorporate
debiasing into the learning algorithm itself [20, 7, 31, 33]. This approach is highly dependent on
model architecture and typically cannot easily scale when the choice of modeling changes. The
third approach is through postprocessing on the final ranking produced by the recommendation
system [17, 29]. This approach is often favored as it is agnostic to the underlying model architecture.
Our proposed methodology is a postprocessing approach which operates on the final ranking with
fairness constraints, and is therefore very generally applicable.
Most of the work for a fair marketplace focuses on achieving fairness for the destination side.
[17, 29]. In a talent search product through which a recruiter searches for qualifying candidates, the
recommendation system strives to achieve fairness on the candidate side by guaranteeing a desired
distribution of top ranked results with respect to gender [17]. Singh and Joachim’s work [29] intro-
duces certain notions of fairness for destination members and focuses on maximizing utility with
fairness constraints via a linear programming setup. Burke’s work [12] talked about multi-sided fair-
ness which is described as consumer side and producer side fairness. The balanced neighborhoods
approach ensures fairness from one side at a time. Mehrotra’s work [26] on music recommendation
service is one of the few that considers both source and destination side fairness. They proposed
several policies to tradeoff relevance and fairness, and have a counterfactual estimation framework
to evaluate these policies offline.
However, a fully generic framework for fairness in a two-sided marketplace is missing in the litera-
ture, and in this paper, we try to fill that gap by extending the work from [29]. Fairness in a two-sided
marketplace can be conceptually considered as a problem on an undirected graph, whereas previous
work has implicitly been considering bipartite graph situations [17, 29]. This point of view does not
seem to have received as much attention in the literature as the more classical question of fairness in
classification, though see [12, 26].
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2 Notions of Fairness in a Two-Sided Marketplace
In much of the fairness literature (e.g [18, 25]), fairness can be understood as a conditional inde-
pendence requirement. Suppose that U(m) represents the utility that a user m has for a system
(which is usually a univariate model score). Suppose that members belong to one of several groups,
G1, ..., GK (for instance, group membership may be determined by a protected attribute such as gen-
der or race). Fairness can be defined as an independence condition between the utilities received by
members and group membership, potentially subject to conditions on member attributes. Formally,
this requirement can be formulated as, if we writem ∈ Gk for membership to groupGk,
Law (U(m)|m ∈ Gk, Z) = Law(U(m)|m ∈ Gk′ , Z) , ∀k, k
′
where Z is a random variable encompassing an additional layer of conditioning. Concretely, with
equalized odds (resp. equality of opportunity) [18], Z is a label and one conditions on Z = 0 or
Z = 1 (resp Z = 1). Many notions of fairness are derived from these equality in law requirements
by using a summary statistic of the distribution such as the mean (e.g. [30]).
However, in a two-sided marketplace every participant in the market has fundamentally a 2-
dimensional vector of utility: one aspect of it is the utility they get as an active participant (we
call this the source utility, e.g. the utility derived from issuing a query) and the other is the utility
they get as a passive participant (we call this the destination or simply dest utility, e.g. the utility
derived from being recommended in a recommender system). Fairness notions, seen as conditional
independence requirements, are therefore easily extended to this 2-sided marketplace setting by re-
quiring equality of the joint distribution of these bivariate utilities. Practically, this condition can be
relaxed by simply requiring equality of the marginal distributions of these utilities.
Definition 1. Fairness from the source and destination side in a 2-sided marketplace can be written
as: for all k, k′,
Law (Usource(m)|m ∈ Gk, Z) = Law(Usource(m)|m ∈ Gk′ , Z) and
Law (Udest(m)|m ∈ Gk, Z) = Law(Udest(m)|m ∈ Gk′ , Z) .
In practice it might be convenient to get a single summary statistic for the total marketplace utility,
which gives rise to other simplified notions of fairness. At the distributional level, one could con-
sider equality of the conditional distributions of Usource(m) + λUdest(m) for a pre-specified λ for
instance. Another layer of simplification comes from moving from distributional requirements to
further “projections” or summary statistics, such as moments; the mean is then very natural.
Throughout the remainder of the paper, we will consider fairness conditions which are moment-
based approximations to the conditional distribution requirements, working off of Definition 1.
These choices ensure that a suitable reranker both exists and can be implemented in large scale
settings.
Formal problem statement: We will begin with some notational conventions before introducing
the problem formally. Let s denote the sourcemember initiating a query q and d denote a destination
member being ranked as a result of the query. Let uqs,d denote the final ranking score for this pair,
which reflects the utility that member s receives from being shown member d. Let P qs (d, r) denote
the probability of showing the d-th destination member in the r-th slot for source s and query q.
Finally, let vr denote the exposure of the r-th slot. We are interested in providing a ranking of the
top m destination members, where m < Dq, the total number of eligible destination members for
query q. Thus, the ranking matrix P qs is of dimensionDq ×m.
In this setting, the expected source side utility, for each (s, q) can be defined as
U sourceq (s) =
∑Dq
d=1
∑m
r=1
uqs,dP
q
s (d, r)vr = u
⊤
s Psv (1)
where us, Ps, and v are the appropriate vectors and matrices.
Remark 1. Note that the position bias v does not usually depend on the query q. Moreover, for
notational simplicity we remove the superscript q unless explicitly required.
Most recommender systems and marketplace problems [4] try to maximize this source side utility.
Destination side utility is much harder to tackle, since it depends of different queries arising from
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different sources. The expected utility a destinationmember d receives from being shown to member
s at rank r for a query q can be written as,
U destq (s, d) = u
q
s,d
∑
r
P qs (d, r) · vr = u
q
s,dP
q
s (d, ·)v (2)
Define for the destination member d, who has been shown to members st1 , ..., stN from queries
qt1 , ..., qtN at times t1, ..., tN prior to time T , the utility up to time T as
U dest(d)[T ] =
∑N
i=1
ρT−tiU destqti
(sti , d) (3)
where ρ is an appropriately chosen discount rate. Explicitly, this definition assumes that older ses-
sions are less valuable than more recent sessions, unless ρ = 1 in which case all are equally valuable.
We will show in Section 3.1 how this definition is used in our framework.
Remark 2. One important difference between the source and destination side utilities is the fact
that for source-side utility for a member can be estimated at a single session-level, while destination
side utility is across sessions. This difference stems from the objective of the optimization problem
being defined to maximize the session-level source side utility. We will, however, see in Section 4
that source-side utility can also be handled across sessions and address how to account for multiple
sessions.
By introducing an optimization-based framework [29] tackle the problem of maximizing source side
utility while maintaining fairness constraints on the destination members. Naturally, the constraints
are at a per-session level. We expand on their framework by tackling two challenging problems:
Problem 1: Adding fairness constraints for destination members at multiple sessions by consider-
ing the multi-session utility as given in (3).
Problem 2: Adding fairness constraints for source members.
We first focus on solving Problem 1. Extending the optimization based framework from [29], the
overall problem of fairly ranking destinationmembers can be written as maximizing the source side
utility for member s and query q while keeping the allocation of the destination members fair:
Maximize u⊤s Psv
Subject to 1⊤Ps = 1, Ps1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ Ps(d, r) ≤ 1, and Ps is fair.
(4)
The first constraint enforces the condition that in each slot r we must show a destination member,
while the second constraint ensures that each destination member may or may not be shown (m <
Dq). In the case when m = Dq, we get equality in the second constraint (Ps becomes constrained
to be a doubly stochastic matrix) and the problem reduces to the exact framework of [29].
Several notions of fairness have been discussed in [29], all of which are applicable here. Moreover,
we show that fairness constraints with respect to the multi-session destination utility (3) can also be
incorporated in a very similar fashion, while still solving the single source member and single query
optimization problem as given in (4). In general, if the fairness constraint or other constraints are
linear, the problem remains a linear program in Ps which can be solved either offline or online. We
will discuss the scalability aspects of this problem in Section 3.2. We primarily focus on solving
Problem 1 in a scalable manner under fairness constraints. We briefly describe how we can also
solve Problem 2 as an extension. The reason being that Problem 2 can be often at direct odds to
what the marketplace or the recommender system is aiming to achieve. We discuss this in detail in
Section 4.
3 Destination Side Fairness
Singh and Joachims [29] cover a wide range of notions of destinationmember fairness, all of which
are applicable in our setting. Following a similar idea, we also consider fairness with respect to
disjoint member groups G1, . . . , Gk. For completeness, we briefly describe some of the notions
here.
Demographic Parity: A cornerstone of fairness to the destination members being shown for a
query is making certain that various groups receive fair exposure in the rankings. Mathematically,
this can be expressed as
1
|Gk|
∑
d∈Gk
∑
r
P qs (d, r)vr =
1
|Gk′ |
∑
d∈Gk′
∑
r
P qs (d, r)vr
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for all k, k′. More compactly, these constraints can be written as f⊤DP,k,k′Psv = 0, where the d-th
component of fDP,k,k′ is
1d∈Gk
|Gk|
−
1d∈G
k′
|Gk′ |
.
Disparate Treatment: This criteria requires that the ratio of exposure of the destination members
being ranked to the utility that they provide be equal across groups:
1
|Gk|U¯q(Gk)
∑
d∈Gk
∑
r
P qs (d, r)vr =
1
|Gk′ |U¯q(Gk′ )
∑
d∈Gk′
∑
r
P qs (d, r)vr
where U¯q(Gk) =
∑
d∈Gk
uqs,d/|Gk|. Similar to above, the constraint reduces to f
⊤
DT,k,k′Psv = 0,
where the d-th component of fDT,k,k′ is
1d∈Gk
|Gk|U¯q(Gk)
−
1d∈G
k′
|Gk′ |U¯q(Gk′)
.
Disparate Impact: This criteria is similar to disparate treatment but explicitly uses the impact of
the ranking based on the utility instead of the exposure on the numerator. Formally,
1
|Gk|U¯q(Gk)
∑
d∈Gk
uqs,d
∑
r
P qs (d, r)vr =
1
|Gk′ |U¯q(Gk′ )
∑
d∈Gk′
uqs,d
∑
r
P qs (d, r)vr
which reduces to f⊤DI,k,k′Psv = 0, where the d-th component of fDI,k,k′ is
u
q
s,d
1d∈Gk
|Gk|U¯q(Gk)
−
u
q
s,d
1d∈G
k′
|Gk′ |U¯q(Gk′ )
.
3.1 Dynamic and Multi-Session Fairness
It is important to ensure that members are receiving utility fairly across multiple sessions. In some
instances, we can measure a member’s utility over time, and ensure that groups are being treated
fairly - dynamically (see also [16]). However, a significant conceptual challenge arises: dynamic
fairness is fundamentally a multi-session problem, whereas our optimization problem is framed on a
per-session basis. Using the destinationmember utilityU dest(d)[T ] as defined in (3) we describe how
a multi-session fairness constraint can be defined and incorporated in the per-session optimization
problem, for example, by requiring that the average cumulative utility be equal between two groups.
Definition 2. The average cumulative utility for groupGk at time t is
µGk [t] =
1
|Gk|
∑
d∈Gk
U dest(d)[t].
If the next query occurs at time T , it easily follows from the (3) that,
U dest(d)[T ] = U destqT (sT , d) + ρ
T−tU dest(d)[t]. (5)
Note that, maintaining the destination side utility with respect to time is computationally efficient
due to the simple update equation as given in (5). Moreover, the incremental utility can be written
as
∆µGk [T ] = µGk [T ]− µGk [t] =
1
|Gk|
∑
d∈Gk
U destqT (sT , d) + (ρ
T−t − 1)µGk [t]
=
1
|Gk|
∑
d∈Gk
∑
r
uqTsT ,dP
qT
sT
(d, r)vr + (ρ
T−t − 1)µGk [t]
Consequently, a fairness constraint requiring equality of average incremental utility across groups,
∆µGk [T ] = ∆µGk′ [T ] for each k and k
′ can be written as u˜sPsw = c where u˜s is a vector having
entries uqs,d
(
1d∈Gk
|Gk|
−
1d∈G
k′
|Gk′ |
)
and c = (1− ρT−t)(µGk [t]− µGk′ [t]). Maintaining the cumulative
utility for each member over time allows the rankings obtained by solving a linear program per each
individual session and query to account for fairness with respect to multi-session metrics.
3.2 Optimization Framework
Based on the above discussion, for any member s, the overall (source-utility) optimization problem
while considering fairness metrics from the destination side can we written as
Maximize u⊤s Psv
Subject to 1⊤Ps = 1, Ps1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ Ps(d, r) ≤ 1, f
⊤
k,k′Psw = 0 and u˜sPsw = c
(6)
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This is a linear program inPs, considering fairness metrics between groupsGk andGk′ . We consider
only two groups for notational simplicity, but additional constraints can be trivially added to solve
the problem for multiple groups. Moreover, we only consider a generic fk,k′ , but can easily add
multiple such constraints as discussed in Section 3.
The optimization problem (6) can be solved at a per-session level, whenever we want to serve rec-
ommendations or results to the member s for query q. This is preferred when the set of queries can
be very diverse, for example, in search systems such as recruiters searching for candidates, people
searching for member cohorts, etc. However, for many other recommender systems, such as news
feed ranking, friend recommendations, movie recommendations, etc... there is no inherent notion of
a query In such use cases, due to a large number of query-per-second (QPS), solving an optimiza-
tion problem at an individual session level can be extremely challenging in industrial practice due
to latency and storage considerations. Instead, we propose a mechanism to solve these at an aggre-
gated session level (while still solving it for each member), thereby guaranteeing that the fairness
constraint will hold across sessions as long as the score distribution of individual models does not
differ drastically.
Let us assume we consider the last S sessions for each member s. Let Ms be the union of the set
of all destination members that were shown in those sessions. Then, Ps is of dimension Ms ×m
wherem is the total number of slots we have. Let us,d denote the average utility of (s, d) pair across
the sessions. Then, the optimization problem is the same as (6) but across multiple sessions with
the fairness constraints taken across the set of Ms members seen throughout the S sessions (rather
than only the candidates for the current session). Note that, under this regime of multiple sessions or
queries for source member s, the entities us and Ps are no longer dependent on the query. Analogous
multi-session destinationmember utilities can be similarly defined.
Solving the Optimization Problem: Since we solve the problem for each member s, we drop
the notation s for simplicity. Rewriting the optimization problem in a vectorized form, we have
Max p⊤(u · v)
s.t. p⊤(fk,k′ · v) = 0, p
⊤(u˜ · v) = c, [Im : Im : · · · : Im]p = 1 and pd ∈ Tm ∀ d ∈M
(7)
Here, p = (p1, . . . , pd, . . . , pM ) is the vectorized version of the matrix P of dimension M × m,
(·) denotes element-wise vector multiplication. Im is the identity matrix of size m ×m and Tm is
the simplex of dimension m, i.e. Tm = {(a1, . . . , am)|
∑m
r=1 ar ≤ 1, ar ≥ 0}. We add a small
regularizer to the objective function and solve the following optimization problem,
Maximize p⊤(u · v) +
γ
2
p⊤p subject to Ap ≤ b and pd ∈ Tm ∀ d ∈M (8)
where A, b encompasses the constraints as given in (7). After solving the optimization problem we
obtain the dual variables λ1, λ2 (corresponding to the fairness constraints) and ηm×1 (corresponding
to the slots/positions). We can then use these dual variables to obtain the primal solution in a online
system, which drastically reduces the latency cost in serving such a system.
Dual To Primal Trick: Using the KKT conditions, it is fairly straightforward to obtain the unique
primal solution of (8) as a function of the dual [6, 11]. Specifically, we have
pˆd(λ1, λ2, η) = ΠTm
(1
γ
{(u · v)d − λ1(fk,k′ · v)d − λ2(u˜ · v)d − η}
)
(9)
whereΠTm denotes the projection onto the simplex Tm and (·)d denotes the vector component corre-
sponding to the d-th member. Note that the primal solution only depends on them+2 dual variables
(λ1, λ2, and ηm×1).Hence, when we have to display the results of the search or the recommended
rankings for the member d, we evaluate the components of the corresponding vectors and perform
the projection operation as shown in (9). There are efficient algorithms for the simplex projection
[15] which makes online scoring highly efficient.
We apply the above transformation on each of the candidate members d to obtain pˆd, for d =
1, . . . , D whereD denotes the total set of candidates to score. In almost all applicationsD > m (i.e.
it is not necessary to rank all D candidates) and consequently, the obtained matrix PˆD×m = (pˆ1 :
pˆ2 : . . . : pˆD)
T is not a doubly stochastic. As a result, to get the final deterministic serving scheme
we cannot use the approach of from [29] via the Birkhoff-von Neumann decomposition [9]. Instead
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we use a simple greedy approach to generate the member at slot r which also helps in reducing
online latency:
member(r) = argmax
d:d is not yet assiged
Pˆ (d, r) for r = 1, . . . ,m.
Moreover, based on the chosen serving scheme we continuously update the destination side utility
as defined in (5). Before each run, we can tweak the destination side fairness constraint to get any
distribution on the destination side utility. See appendix for further discussion.
4 Extension to Source Side Fairness
While the optimization problem (4) yields rankings which maximize the utility for the source side
members subject to providing fairness to the destination members, it is naturally also of interest to
ensure that the utility obtained by the source is not biased for one group versus the other.
It is important to note the distinction here between source and destination side fairness. The destina-
tion side unfairness is easily observable from a single source member’s point of view. For instance,
if a query results in large exposure of one group versus another, it can be easily seen and identified by
the viewer (or source member). On the contrary, if a group of source members is given consistently
better results compared with another, it is not directly observable from the single source perspective.
Nevertheless, since the ranking algorithms are by default trying to optimize the source side utility, it
is unlikely that a group of source members would be consistently achieving poorer utility in a well-
functioning system. Moreover, if such groups exist, then a lot of effort would actually be put in place
in industrial practice to improve their utility through iterations of better machine learning models,
as such efforts have a direct impact on business metrics. For this reason, our primary focus has been
on destination side fairness. Nevertheless, our framework is rich enough to handle multi-session
source-side utility fairness constraints. We now describe how to do just that.
A baseline measure for source side fairness is ensuring that they receive comparable expected utility
across groups over multiple sessions. Suppose that members s1, ..., snk belonging to group Gk
initiate queries q1, ..., qnk at times t1, ..., tnk , then we can define cumulative expected utility for
groupGk up to time T as
E [U source(Gk, T )] =
∑
i:ti≤T
ρT−tiU sourceqi (si) =
∑
i:ti≤T
ρT−tiu⊤siPsiv
where ρ is a discount factor for the time of the query. Similar to the multi-session destination utility,
it is readily seen that if the first query q after time T occurs at time T + δ, and is initiated by
member s, then E [U source(Gk, T + δ)] = u
⊤
s Psv+ ρ
δ
E [U source(Gk, T )] . Consequently, if member
s belonging to groupGk initiates a query q at time T + δ , a constraint requiring that the cumulative
expected utility be equal between groups, i.e. E [U source(Gk, T + δ)] = E [U
source(Gk′ , T + δ)] for
all k, k′, can be written as u⊤s Psv = E [U
source(Gk′ , T + δ)] − ρδE [U source(Gk, T )], which is a set
of linear constraints and hence easily incorporated in our LP framework.
Note that, however, this constraint somewhat conflicts with the maximization objective of (6) and
brings to light the important concept of losing accuracy in lieu of bringing in fairness [31]. Here,
we present the framework which makes incorporating such constraint feasible and scalable. To
incorporate both source side and destination side fairness, the full optimization problem can be
written as:
Minimize
∑
k′ 6=k
∣∣u⊤s Psv − ck,k′
∣∣
Subject to 1⊤Ps = 1, Ps1 ≤ 1, 0 ≤ Ps(d, r) ≤ 1, f
⊤
k,k′Psw = 0, u˜sPsw = c
(10)
where ck,k′ = E [U
source(Gk′ , T + δ)] − ρδE [U source(Gk, T )] or an appropriately chosen value to
sway the distribution in some direction. This is still a linear program and can be handled in a very
similar manner as we discussed in Section 3.2.
5 Experimental Results
To investigate the behavior of our proposals in a controlled environment, we simulate a member-to-
member recommender system, which provides members with suggestions of other members with
whom to “connect”, i.e. a simple version of a two-sided marketplace.
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Simulation setup: We use a graph to represent connections between members. Because we are
interested in a two-sided marketplace where both “sides” of the marketplace play a similar role, our
graph is not bipartite (as it would be in a consumer-product setting) but is a standard undirected
graph. The vertices of the graph correspond to members and the edges to whether or not there is a
connection between vertices. When we initialize the vertices, each vertex of the graph (represent-
ing a member) is given a binary group membership (on which we want to enforce fairness) and a
vector of covariates,Xi. The member and graph affinity between two members i and j is measured
as Affmember(i, j) = −‖Xi − Xj‖2 and AffGraph(i, j) = A2t (i, j), respectively, where At is the
adjacency matrix at time t, representing the number of common connections between i and j.
The graph evolves in the following manner. A vertex i is picked at random. For each other vertex j,
a “model” normalized score s(i, j) is computed as a function of Affmember and AffGraph . A subset of
vertices of size D with the highest scores are then considered eligible for showing. Among them, a
smaller subset of size m (possibly identified after re-ranking to incorporate fairness constraints, see
below) is then “shown”. For the subset of sizem of members that are shown, an edge (or connection)
in the graph is created at random with a probability that decays according to the position. Please see
the Appendix for further details. The fairness adjustments are dealt with in the following fashion:
1. No fairness adjustment in the ranking (noReranker in Table 1)
2. Equality of opportunity, using the primal for destination side fairness (primal)
3. Equality of opportunity, using the dual method for destination side fairness (dualNoDynamic)
4. Multi-Session destination utility adjustment via the dual (dualWithDynamic).
Numerical results: We keep track of the source and destination side utilities, which are aggregated
by summation across sessions. We consider three simulation settings, each with 1000 members and
1000 iterations, but with different numbers of “shown” members,m, and different rates of the dual
refresh, t (the gap in iterations where we re-solve the primal). We report the average difference in
exposure between the two groups (∆DP) and the mean absolute value difference for this quantity,
the ratio of average source utility between the groups and the percentage of total destination utility in
Group 0 as our metrics (see the appendix for precise definitions). The results for a single simulation
is shown in Table 1. For more detailed result with multiple runs and variance estimates, please see
the appendix.
Settings Method ∆DP ∆|DP|
Ratio of % Total
Source Utility Destination Utility
noReranker -0.0216 0.1964 0.5100 0.7051
m = 10 primal 0.0179 0.1671 0.5024 0.5371
t = 50 dualNoDynamic 0.0055 0.2125 0.5100 0.5860
dualWithDynamic 0.0249 0.2008 0.5100 0.5706
noReranker -0.0072 0.1182 0.5100 0.7059
m = 20 primal 0.0109 0.1002 0.5023 0.5269
t = 50 dualNoDynamic 0.0122 0.1090 0.5099 0.5536
dualWithDynamic 0.0155 0.1099 0.5099 0.5371
noReranker -0.0072 0.1182 0.5100 0.7059
m = 20 primal 0.0109 0.1002 0.5023 0.5269
t = 20 dualNoDynamic 0.0177 0.1105 0.5099 0.5210
dualWithDynamic 0.0185 0.1090 0.5099 0.5166
Table 1: Simulation Results
Learnings: The simulations illustrate the fact that adding fairness re-rankers help rebalance desti-
nation utility (last column) while not significantly altering source utility metrics (see the 5th column
in Table 1). Refreshing the dual parameters more often helps bring destination utility results closer
(see last two rows and the last column in Table 1), at the cost of slower computations (not reported
here). Increasing the number of “shown” slots makes satisfying fairness constraints easier a priori,
and this is also verified in our simulations (first two rows and last column). We did not implement
the source utility re-ranker in this set of simulations since even without mitigation the setup was
such that source utility was comparable across both groups (columns 5 above)- see also discussion
in Section 4. We leave this to future work and real-world implementation.
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6 Conclusion
Multi-sided marketplaces can involve intricate member to member interactions, presenting a chal-
lenge for defining fairness and ensuring fairness not only by groups of members, but also by the
role in which they are participating in the marketplace. Existing literature has generally addressed
the issue of fairness in a single-sided marketplace. Our present work provides definitions of fairness
for two-sided marketplaces, and guarantees that members are given fair treatment over-time with
respect to source and destination side utilities that are computed across sessions. Our simulations
served as proof of concept to demonstrate that without proper intervention, two-sided marketplaces
can present severe implicit discrimination - in terms of utility or representation/exposure - against
groups of underserved members. Moreover, the present framework can help limit over time such
discrimination.
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Broader Impact
Machine Learning (ML) systems may contain implicit biases and reproduce or reinforce them. It
is hence crucial to develop tools for assessment and mitigations of potential implicit biases in large
scale ML systems, since they increasingly power decisions affecting larger and larger portions of
society.
The situation where the ML system powers a 2-sided marketplace has received less attention in the
literature than the now classic question of fairness in classification. We tackle this fairness-in-a-2-
sided marketplace problem by proposing tools grounded in sound theoretical principles and practi-
cally applicable at Internet-data scale. We hope that these tools will be broadly applicable where
they matter crucially, in real-life applications. Our methods try to measure and mitigate unfairness
with respect to classic ethical principles, rooted in moral and political Philosophy principles using
for instance the concept of disparate impact (see also Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
guidelines and rules) and disparate treatment.
This research should benefit groups that are currently disadvantaged in large-scale 2-sided market-
places powered by automatic recommendation systems and should yield positive outcomes for those
groups. The consequences of failure of the system might be the perpetuation of the status quo in
terms of performance (broadly construed) of those systems. We have tried to address questions re-
lated to the dynamic aspects of fairness which remain very challenging. Our paper has not addressed
intersectionality issues explicitly, though the framework is rich enough to handle some intersectional
questions. Hence good practice will require not only monitoring the fairness performance of the
tools we have developed but also whether they have unintended intersectional consequences and
potentially refining some of the constraints in our LP formulation to mitigate them if they appear in
practice.
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A Appendix
A.1 Further details on simulation experiments
Here are more details on the simulations were discussed in Section 5.
Graph Initialization: When we initialize the graph, we create a stochastic block model [21] with
2 blocks to initialize the edges. We callA0 the corresponding adjacencymatrix, with, by convention,
A0(i, i) = 0 for all i. At time t, t ≥ 0, the graph affinity between two vertices i and j is
AffGraph(i, j) = A
2
t (i, j),
where At is the adjacency matrix at time t. This graph affinity represents the number of common
connections between i and j.
Graph Evolution: The graph evolves in the following manner. A vertex i is picked at random.
For each other vertex j, a “model” score s(i, j) is computed as
s(i, j) = p(Gi, Gj) exp(λAffGraph(i, j)) exp(µAffmember(i, j)),
where Affmember(i, j) = −‖Xi − Xj‖2. The scores are then normalized by their sum. A subset
of vertices of size D with the highest scores are then considered eligible for showing. Among the
eligible vertices, a smaller subset of sizem of the topD vertices (possibly identified after re-ranking
to incorporate fairness constraints) is then “shown”. The fairness constraints used for re-ranking
are described in detail below. For the subset of size m of members that are shown, an edge (or
connection) in the graph is created at random with probability pCTR at k, where pCTR is the position
bias at k multiplied by a base probability, pbase, with pbase = .1. This corresponds to an edge being
created if and only if the member initiating the query requests it (which happens with probability
pCTR at k).
Parameter Settings: We used p0 = 0.65, as the fraction of group membership in group 0. We
set σ2 = .1, and in our simulations, the covariates are such thatXi ∼ N (µGi , σ
2I), the (two) µGi ’s
are picked at random, with µGi ∼ N (0, Idcov ), dcov = 30. Block model parameters were p00 =
.05,p11 = .04,p01 = p01 = .01. By default, p(Gi, Gj) = 1. Position bias at k is posBias(k) =
1/(1+logk). We used a graph with 103 vertices and ran the simulation for 1, 000 iterations/sessions.
The primal reranker is considerably slower than doing either no reranking or using the dual trick. So
we ran this simulation for only 100 iterations. To understand the impact of refreshing the dual more
often, we ran simulations with the dual being refreshed every 50 and then 20 iterations.
In the simulations, we picked λ and µ adaptively so the ratio of the two highest scores is equal to
.9 (though this is a tuning parameter that could be changed). This was to avoid a potential problem
with the increase in the number of connections, which could end up disproportionately weighing the
graph affinity and resulting in e.g. the largest score being overwhelming large compared to all other
scores. By default, p(Gi, Gj) = 1, i.e. there is no systematic bias per group membership, besides
the one induced by the structure of the graph and the difference in covariates. D = 250 though our
simulations are flexible and can of course incorporate other parameters. The numberm of members
“shown” ism = 10, unless otherwise noted.
In the simulation setup above, Group 1 is disadvantaged in terms of exposure because of its smaller
size (and weaker connectivity) and the way the scores are computed, the difference in means between
the two groups rendering each group less visible to the other. Within groups the simulation setup
pretty much guarantees homogeneity. This is partly why we set p(Gi, Gj) = 1 and not a different
function of Gi and Gj to illustrate the fact that even without systematic group bias some of the
issues we had raised were already observable, owing just to initial network structure.
Utlity Details: In the simulations reported below, the dest utility is the exposure utility, i.e. des-
tination j shown at position k ≤ m has utility Udest(j) = posBias(k) and 0 if not exposed. The
source side utility for source i is
Usource(i) =
∑
1≤k≤m
s(i, j(k))posBias(k)
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where s(i, j(k)) is the k-th largest score s(i, j).
All utilities are aggregated by summation across sessions. To make comparisons across simulations
below more meaningful, we set the seed before the network generation phase and then set the seed
before each of the run of the different methods. This ensures that the networks on which the simu-
lations were run were exactly the same, that the queries were initiated in the same order etc. This is
also why when displaying the same number of slots the simulation results are exactly the same for
the methods not using a re-reranker.
Optimization Details: The primal simulations were comparatively very slow - in line with our
expectations. Finally, the settings used for the LP solver can (not so surprisingly) have some im-
pact of the performance of the rerankers, so we used quite stringent tolerance results in the results
presented below. For the equality of opportunity constraint we consider |f⊤k,k′Psw| < ǫ, where ǫ is
chosen as:
ǫ =
1
|[m]odd|
∑
k∈[m]odd
posBias(k)−
1
|[m]even|
∑
k∈[m]even
posBias(k)
where [m]odd and [m]even are the odd and even index of [m] = 1, . . . ,m. For the dynamic constraint
we choose |u˜sPsw| ≤ 0.1.
A.2 Metric Details
We give more context on the metrics we track in the simulation:
1. Demographic Parity in Exposure: (∆DP) We consider the m members “shown”. For
each query we compute the average exposure of Group 0 and Group 1, accounting for
position bias. And we compute the difference between the average exposure of Group 0
and that of Group 1. We then report the mean across all sessions.
2. Absolute Demographic Parity in Exposure: ∆|DP|: this is the same as above, except at
the next-to-last step we take the absolute value of the average exposure between groups for
each session. Then we report the mean across sessions.
3. Average Source Utility G0: U¯
source
G0
: compute the source utility for members of group 0
who initiated at least 1 query. Source utility is the sum of scores of members recommended
to the source weighted by position bias.
4. Average Source Utility G1: U¯
source
G1
: compute the source utility for members of group 1
who initiated at least 1 query.
5. Ratio of Average Source Utilities G0G1:
rsourceG0G1 :=
U¯ sourceG0
U¯ sourceG0 + U¯
source
G1
6. Percentage Total Source Utility In G0: PT
source
G0
: computes the sum of source utilities
(with at least 1 query) in G0 and divide this by total source Utility (for members having
initiated at least 1 query)
7. Average Destination Utility G0: U¯
dest
G0
: Average dest Utility for members of group 0
having been recommended in at least 1 query. Dest utility for an individual member is
measured by the position bias at the position they are being recommended at.
8. Average Destination Utility G1: U¯
dest
G1
: average dest Utility for members of group 1 hav-
ing been recommended in at least 1 query.
9. Ratio of Average Destination Utilities G0G1:
rdestG0G1 :=
U¯destG0
U¯destG0 + U¯
dest
G1
10. Percentage Total Destination Utility In G0: PT
dest
G0
: this is the sum of dest Utility for
members in Group 0 having been recommended at least once divided the total dest Utility
for members having been recommended at least once.
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A.3 Full Results
We now state the full results of the simulation results with respect to the different metrics as stated
above.
Method ∆DP ∆|DP| U¯ sourceG0
U¯
source
G1
r
source
G0G1
PT
source
G0
U¯
dest
G0
U¯
dest
G1
r
dest
G0G1
PT
dest
G0
No Reranker -0.0216 0.1964 0.0114 0.0110 0.5101 0.6574 7.5894 5.8574 0.5644 0.7051
Primal 0.0179 0.1671 0.0073 0.0073 0.5024 0.6349 1.2016 1.5402 0.4382 0.5371
Dual No Dynamic 0.0055 0.2126 0.0115 0.0110 0.5101 0.6574 6.3920 7.9805 0.4447 0.5861
Dual Dynamic 0.0249 0.2009 0.01147 0.0110 0.5100 0.6574 6.2242 8.2771 0.4292 0.5707
Table 2: Here we have 1000 members, 1000 iterations, m = 10 slots, and 50 epochs in dual refresh.
Method ∆DP ∆|DP| U¯ sourceG0
U¯
source
G1
r
source
G0G1
PT
source
G0
U¯
dest
G0
U¯
dest
G1
r
dest
G0G1
PT
dest
G0
No Reranker -0.0073 0.1182 0.0176 0.01689 0.5101 0.6574 11.2915 8.7335 0.5639 0.7059
Primal 0.0110 0.1002 0.0112 0.0111 0.5024 0.6348 1.3247 1.8482 0.4175 0.5269
Dual No Dynamic 0.0122 0.1090 0.0176 0.0169 0.5100 0.6573 8.9838 13.0638 0.4075 0.5537
Dual Dynamic 0.0156 0.1010 0.0176 0.0169 0.5100 0.6573 8.7293 13.5090 0.3925 0.5372
Table 3: Here we have 1000 members, 1000 iterations, m = 20 slots, and 50 epochs in dual refresh.
Method ∆DP ∆|DP| U¯ sourceG0
U¯
source
G1
r
source
G0G1
PT
source
G0
U¯
dest
G0
U¯
dest
G1
r
dest
G0G1
PT
dest
G0
No Reranker -0.0073 0.1182 0.0176 0.0169 0.5101 0.6574 11.2915 8.7335 0.5639 0.7059
Primal 0.0110 0.1002 0.0112 0.0111 0.5024 0.6348 1.3246 1.8482 0.4175 0.5269
Dual no Dynamic 0.0177 0.1106 0.0176 0.0169 0.5100 0.6573 8.4811 13.9792 0.3776 0.5210
Dual with Dynamic 0.0186 0.1090 0.0176 0.0169 0.5099 0.6573 8.3701 14.0656 0.3731 0.5167
Table 4: Here we have 1000 members, 1000 iterations, m = 20 slots, and 20 epochs in dual refresh.
A.4 Bootstrap Results
We also repeat each of the following above results 100 times with varying seed to estimate the
variance of each of metrics. The detailed table result is given below with the mean and 95% error
estimates.
Method ∆DP ∆|DP| U¯ sourceG0
U¯
source
G1
r
source
G0G1
PT
source
G0
U¯
dest
G0
U¯
dest
G1
r
dest
G0G1
PT
dest
G0
No Reranker
0.0000196 0.1876794 0.0114761 0.0110283 0.5099510 0.6572877 7.1818291 6.5941001 0.5214912 0.6709937
(±1.53e-3) (±1.23e-3) (±1.43e-6) (±1.25e-6) (±3.85e-5) (±3.47e-5) (±3.41e-2) (±5.89e-2) (±3.33e-3) (±2.93e-3)
Primal
0.0286859 0.1837153 0.0073293 0.0072788 0.5017288 0.6342587 1.2185111 1.5345218 0.4426842 0.5331251
(±2.15e-3) (±2.10e-3) (±1.58e-6) (±1.43e-6) (±6.90e-5) (±6.40e-5) (±7.97e-3) (±1.16e-2) (±2.26e-3) (±1.06e-3)
Dual 0.0450135 0.2051839 0.0114708 0.0110255 0.5098977 0.6572397 6.0227132 8.6437419 0.4109908 0.5569184
No Dynamic (±2.92e-3) (±2.05e-3) (±1.46e-6) (±1.27e-6) (±3.92e-5) (±3.53e-5) (±5.08e-2) (±9.33e-2) (±4.62e-3) (±4.91e-3)
Dual 0.0461693 0.2047534 0.0114707 0.0110256 0.5098946 0.6572369 6.0011009 8.6903315 0.4088543 0.5547041
With Dynamic (±2.92e-3) (±2.08e-3) (±1.48e-6) (±1.28e-6) (±3.95e-5) (±3.56e-5) (±5.17e-2) (±9.71e-2) (±4.75e-3) (±5.00e-3)
Table 5: m = 10 slots and 50 epochs in dual refresh.
Method ∆DP ∆|DP| U¯ sourceG0
U¯
source
G1
r
source
G0G1
PT
source
G0
U¯
dest
G0
U¯
dest
G1
r
dest
G0G1
PT
dest
G0
No Reranker
0.0020038 0.1097322 0.0175915 0.0169085 0.5098985 0.6572404 10.7350035 9.8549059 0.5215575 0.6700181
(±9.01e-4) (±6.86e-4) (±2.11e-6) (±1.81e-6) (±3.65e-5) (±3.29e-5) (±5.11e-2) (±9.29e-2) (±3.49e-3) (±3.02e-3)
Primal
0.0107691 0.1045706 0.0112299 0.0111545 0.5016847 0.6342178 1.3473105 1.8612044 0.4199544 0.5273710
(±1.47e-3) (±1.28e-3) (±2.32e-6) (±2.06e-6) (±6.36e-5) (±5.91e-5) (±7.65e-3) (±1.10e-2) (±1.86e-3) (±7.04e-4)
Dual 0.0182423 0.1104472 0.0175825 0.0169060 0.5098076 0.6571585 8.7662834 13.4431304 0.3950420 0.5437587
No Dynamic (±1.17e-3) (±9.75e-4) (±2.19e-6) (±1.90e-6) (±3.73e-5) (±3.36e-5) (±7.50e-2) (±1.39e-1) (±4.51e-3) (±4.71e-3)
Dual 0.0172247 0.1087706 0.0175828 0.0169063 0.5098077 0.6571586 8.7509092 13.4787915 0.3939329 0.5426752
With Dynamic (±1.09e-3) (±8.26e-4) (±2.18e-6) (±1.90e-6) (±3.78e-5) (±3.41e-5) (±7.17e-2) (±1.28e-1) (±4.21e-3) (±4.37e-3)
Table 6: m = 20 slots and 50 epochs in dual refresh.
Note that over 100 iterations we get consistent results. That is source side utilities are usually
automatically balanced. The dest side utilities improve in the case whenm increases from 10 to 20.
Also, we fast dual refresh, we are getting better results, by sacrificing computation time.
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Method ∆DP ∆|DP| U¯ sourceG0
U¯
source
G1
r
source
G0G1
PT
source
G0
U¯
dest
G0
U¯
dest
G1
r
dest
G0G1
PT
dest
G0
No Reranker
0.0020038 0.1097322 0.0175915 0.0169085 0.5098985 0.6572404 10.7350035 9.8549059 0.5215575 0.6700181
(±9.01e-4) (±6.86e-4) (±2.11e-6) (±1.81e-6) (±3.65e-5) (±3.29e-5) (±5.11e-2) (±9.29e-2) (±3.49e-3) (±3.02e-3)
Primal
0.0107691 0.1045706 0.0112299 0.0111545 0.5016847 0.6342178 1.3473105 1.8612044 0.4199544 0.5273710
(±1.47e-3) (±1.28e-3) (±2.32e-6) (±2.06e-6) (±6.36e-5) (±5.91e-5) (±7.65e-3) (±1.10e-2) (±1.86e-3) (±7.04e-4)
Dual 0.0224202 0.1102967 0.0175802 0.0169053 0.5097851 0.6571382 8.2356443 14.4325451 0.3634357 0.5092317
No Dynamic (±1.02e-3) (±7.34e-4) (±2.15e-6) (±1.85e-6) (±3.74e-5) (±3.37e-5) (±4.94e-2) (±8.90e-2) (±2.76e-3) (±3.00e-3)
Dual 0.0211929 0.1086926 0.0175805 0.0169055 0.5097863 0.6571393 8.2246019 14.4590305 0.3626681 0.5085179
With Dynamic (±9.40e-4) (±7.08e-4) (±2.14e-6) (±1.86e-6) (±3.72e-5) (±3.35e-5) (±4.20e-2) (±7.59e-2) (±2.35e-3) (±2.53e-3)
Table 7: m = 20 slots and 20 epochs in dual refresh.
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